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PLANT RELOCATION: CATCHING UP WITH THE
RUNAWAY SHOPt
ROBERT A. SWIFT *
INTRODUCTION
Once a tempest of controversy, the law regarding plant relocation
has remained comparatively sedate for the past several years. However,
recent Supreme Court decisions in several collateral areas of labor law
have brought into question the continued validity of previous National
Labor Relations .Board (NLRB or Board) policies in relocation cases.
Plant relocations are common in our economy and have taken place
with increased rapidity in the past few years.' Industrialists, in striving
to compete successfully with both domestic and imported manufac-
tures, have frequently been forced to resort to relocating their plants
to non-unionized areas of the country to cut labor costs. As the inci-
dence of relocations rises, the severe economic effects of a plant relo-
cation and its impact on the livelihood of employees and unions make
this an increasingly important area of the law.
This article will consider the broad problem of plant relocation
as it relates to the economy and to the law of labor relations. Specifi-
cally, it will consider the economic forces that cause an employer to
relocate, and the circumstances that convert a plant relocation into a
"runaway shop." It will then probe the effect on relocation of recent
Supreme Court rulings in the related areas of employer discrimination,
the duty to decision bargain, successorship, and the adequacy of the
remedies of the NLRB.
f This study was undertaken and funded pursuant to the Labor Relations and Public
Policy project of the Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania.
* BA., Ilaverford College; J.D., New York University School of Law; Research
Associate, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
1 Fulton, New Factors in Plant Location, 49 Ilarv. Bus. Rev. 4, 5 (May-June 1971).
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I. DEFINING THE RUNAWAY SHOP
Plant relocation has two basic elements of legal significance: first,
substantially identical jobs must be available in a different locale; sec-
ond, the employees at the original plant site would normally be dis-
charged. Within this definition of plant relocation, there are three
categories. First there is the employer who decides to abandon his
current plant and remove his whole business to a new location.' Next
there is the situation in which an employer only wishes to relocate a
particular operation in his business to a new site while continuing the
other operations at the original site.' Finally there is the multi-plant
employer who transfers production contracts from one plant to an-
Other.4
 These categories may be differentiated from plant closings,
partial closings, subcontracting and automation where the jobs have
either disappeared or are no longer within the employer's control. This
distinction becomes significant in framing remedies to enforce the law
effectively!
Plant relocation becomes a "runaway shop" when the move is
effected for anti-union motives, an action prohibited under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA)! An unlawful relocation can take
place if an employer wants to thwart a union altogether or simply to
remove unionization's adverse effect on the company's profitability.
Though the runaway shop is not expressly prohibited by section
8(a) 7
 of the NLRA, a relocation to defeat a union has been character-
ized by the Board and the courts as falling within the prohibitions of
three possible paragraphs of section 8(a). A discharge of employees
in connection with a plant relocation may violate section 8(a) (3),9
which forbids employer discrimination against employees related to
union affiliation or activity. An employer violates section 8(a) (5) 9
if his purpose in removing the plant is to avoid his duty to bargain
with the union. In addition, he commits a section 8(a)(1) 10
 violation,
derivative of the 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) violations, for interfering with
the union's section 7 11
 right to organize by relocating in the face of
unionization.
2
 See, e.g., McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958, 74 L.R.R.M. 1756 (1970)
(Supp. Dec. & Order), aff'd sub nom. ILGWU v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 80 L.R.R.M. 2716
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
8
 See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369, 34 L.R.R.M. 1209
(1954).
4
 See, e.g., Industrial Fabricating Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 41 L.R.R.M. 1038 (1957).
t See text at notes 187-88 infra.
0
 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1970).
7
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
8
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
9
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
10
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
11 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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However, it is rare for a relocation to occur solely on account of
an employer's anti-union motives. The circumstances of plant reloca-
tion virtually prohibit the moving of plants for discriminatory reasons
absent economic justification. The selection of a plant site is a deter-
mination of which location, in view of all the circumstances, will enable
the delivery of the manufactured product at the lowest cost to the
customer.' Employers relocate because of detrimental economic fac-
tors at the current location and the promise of greater economies at
the new site. Thus, management's reasons for abandoning a location
may include:
(1) the need for expansion coupled with a desire to place
the new capacity in a more advantageous location for
marketing;
(2) the depletion of reliable sources of quality materials at
competitive prices;
(3) changes in the availability of dependable transportation
at competitive prices;
(4) an adverse rise in the cost of production because of labor
and/or overhead increases."
Although strained labor relations may enter into decisions to re-
locate, economics in competitive industries prevent them from predom-
inating. The "rugged individualist" management practices of the first
part of the twentieth century have given way to reasoned and scientific
approaches.14 Plant location is itself a science utilizing detailed tech-
niques of systems analysis. Rarely does a company relocate without
careful study, and usually the advice of consultants is utilized.' The
movement itself entails economic loss from disruption of production,
employee benefits and the cost of physically moving assets and per-
12 R. Reed, Jr,, Plant Location, Layout, and Maintenance 3 (1967).
18 See H. Timms, The Production Function in Business 293-94 (1962); Comment,
The NLRB's Pursuit of the Runaway Shop, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 450, 451 (1962). For a
thorough listing of major factors influencing the choice of a new location, see R. Reed, Jr.,
supra note 12, at 16-17.
14 See R. Reed, Jr., Plant Layout: Functions, Principles and Techniques 343 (1961):
In the past it has been common to locate a plant either upon the wishes
or whims of the individual financier or in a location where similar industries have
become popular. However, as any country develops industrially; as the trans-
portation systems of that country improve and materials and labor are dispersed
to a variety of new locations; and as a good labor supply becomes more wide-
spread, the location of plants must be increasingly controlled by the economic
factors and conditions created by alternative sites, and less by traditional influ-
ences or the personal whims of the financier. Proper plant site selection requires
scientific determination of the location factors involved for particular installation,
and the scientific analysis of those factors, in order to ensure a location which will
provide optimum production and business atmospheres.
IS F. Moore, Manufacturing Management 169 (5th ed. 1969).
1137
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
sonnel. Thus, the effect of an abrupt, ill-planned relocation may be to
bankrupt the enterprise."
The effect of restrictive interpretations of the NLRA by the Board
with respect to plant relocation has been to prevent employers from
effecting economically justified relocations. Shifts in the geographical
concentration of supply and demand occur with frequency in a dynamic
economy but are met with more consternation than action from man-
agement. Relocations probably should occur more frequently than they
presently do," but management is typically reluctant to relocate be-
cause of fear of conflict with the labor laws. Management's decision
to relocate not withstanding this reluctance is often a response to ag-
gregated diseconomies rather than a current occurrence, and a decline
in the profit margin will not usually instigate a move unless it is severe
or sustained. Thus, to characterize a relocation according to the final
event prompting it is to misunderstand the management decision-mak-
ing process.
In certain industries, a decisive factor prompting relocation has
been the availability of less expensive labor at the new location, and
particularly nonunion labor." Unions can impose higher costs on em-
ployers by increasing wages as well as by restricting employment
practices designed to achieve employer economies. Unions more power-
ful than their management counterparts can achieve gains which im-
pose artificial wage levels. Where the employee entry level skill is low,
unions have removed the competitive effect of unorganized labor. Thus,
those companies which have a low ratio of capital to cost of produc-
tion and which employ largely unskilled or semi-skilled laborers are
more susceptible to relocation as an answer to unionism."
14 Id. at 167.
17 Id. at 170.
18
 Comment, The NLRB's Pursuit of the Runaway Shop, supra note 13, at 451;
Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607, 613, 73 L.R.R.M. 1044, 1045 (1969).
10
 Fuchs, Changes in the Location of Manufacturing in the United States Since 1929,
at 164-65 (1962) ; Note, The Effect of Relocation or Sale of Industry Upon Labor-
Management Relations, 5 W. Res. L. Rev. 84, 86 (1953).
The apparel industry illustrates this point well. See G. McLaughlin & S. Robock, Why
Industry Moves South 71 (1949). Apparel manufacturers have comparatively little capital
invested in machinery, but maintain substantial cloth inventory. The machinery is small
and needs no specially adapted buildings to house it. Because transportation of the finished
product is relatively inexpensive, the plant need not be near wholesale outlets. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 411, 418, 1 L.R.R.M. 84, — (1936). In addition,
the cost of plant removal is comparatively inexpensive. See Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B.
664, 675, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405, — (1965), where in 1963 the removal of a garment plant
employing 50 to 60 full-time workers from New York to Miami, Fla. cost $2516.
Between 1950 and 1969, the number of apparel industry employees working in the
South increased from 15.3% to 38.3% of the U.S. total, while the number employed
in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, formerly the center of the apparel industry,
declined from 54.8% to 37.8%. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull.
1312-7, Employment and Earnings, United States, 1909-70 (1971); U.S. Bureau of
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In determining whether a relocation has been effected for pro-
hibited anti-union reasons, the Board has traditionally considered a
number of factors. Primarily, it has attempted to gauge whether the
motivating factor behind the relocation was a valid economic reason,
or whether its purpose was to discriminate against or discourage union-
ism within the plant. However, since employers were seldom solely
motivated by one or the other reasons, the Board has had difficulty
in the past in setting forth a consistent rule as to when a relocation
was a prohibited runaway shop. 2° Other factors which the Board has
considered in distinguishing between a valid relocation and a runaway
shop are: (1) whether the employer has notified the union of the
relocation and has consented to bargain with the union about the relo-
cation; and (2) whether the employer has attempted to disguise a
runaway shop by selling the plant to a new owner or by reincorporating,
with a subsequent removal of the plant. When the Board has found
that a plant relocation had in reality been effected for anti-union mo-
tives or that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to bargain concerning the removal, it has had difficulty in
formulating a remedy which at the same time was within the scope
of its power; was equitable to all of the parties involved—the em-
ployer, the union and the employees at the old plant; and fulfilled
the purposes of the Act.
While there has not been a great deal of movement in the law on
plant relocations, several recent decisions of the Supreme Court, con-
cerning employer discrimination, the duty to decision bargain, succes-
sorship, and the adequacy of Board remedies have to a large extent
altered the law in these related areas. Considered together, these
changes may have a significant impact on future Board and court
reactions to plant relocations.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATED AREAS AND THEIR
EFFECT ON PLANT RELOCATIONS
A. The Impact of Great Dane on Section 8(a) (3) Violations
Employees discharged on account of a plant relocation may allege
a section 8(a) (3) violation. That section makes it an unfair labor
Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. 1370-7, Employment and Earnings, States and
Areas, 1934-69 (1971). This trend is expected to continue. See Shobecoff, Cheap Imports
& Jeans Imperial Dressmakers Here, N. Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1973, at 25, col. 1. Since 1956,
total union membership has declined slightly while the total employment in the industry
increased approximately 10% over the same period. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Annual
Survey of Manufactures (1970); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull.
1635, Labor in the Textile and Apparel Industries (1969). The decline in percentage
union membership can be attributed to relocations in difficult to organize areas. Id, at 48.
20 Compare Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212, 45 L.R.R.M. 1524 (1960), with
Trenton Garment Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 1186, IA L.R.R.M. 456 (1938).
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C
practice for an employer to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . ."" Though
the basic charge is discrimination, proof of anti-union motivation as
well as a discriminatory effect upon the union of the employer action
has been central to a violation. Such was the congressional intent,"
and the NLRB has interpreted the section in this manner."
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.," the Supreme Court held
that an employer who refused to pay vacation benefits to strikers while
announcing an intention to pay such benefits to non-strikers violated
section 8(a) (3) even though he was not proved to have had an anti-
union motivation." In so holding, the Court significantly modified
the requirement of proving discrimination. If the General Counsel
of the NLRB can adduce prima facie evidence of anti-union motiva-
tion, the employer must come forward with proof of substantial and
legitimate business justification. If the employer. fails to meet this bur-
den, the evidence of violation is sufficient without substantial proof
of anti-union motivation. Where the employer does submit evidence of
business justification, the General Counsel may still not be required
to show substantial anti-union motivation. If the trial examiner char-
acterizes the employer's conduct as "inherently destructive" of em-
ployee rights, nothing beyond prima facie evidence is required to make
the case ripe for the balancing test determination. However, if the
employer's conduct is characterized as having only a comparatively
slight effect on employee rights, the complaint will be dismissed unless
the General Counsel proves substantial anti-union motivation. Conse-
quently, the fate of many cases hinges on the trial examiner's, and
ultimately the Board's, characterization of employer conduct.
Subsequent to Great Dane, relocation has been treated by the
Board as conduct having only a comparatively slight effect on employee
rights. In American Carpet Mills, inc.," the Board adopted the deci-
sion of the trial examiner, refusing to find the employer's conduct
inherently destructive of employee rights although that was the posi-
tion advocated by the General Counsel." The employer had decided
to relocate his clerical operation before the union was certified, causing
the union to allege a discriminatory discharge of the clerical employees.
21 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (3) (1970).
22 79 Cong. Rec. 2333 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Boland). See discussion in Comment,
Proving an 8(a) (3) Violation: The Changing Standard, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 866, 867
(1966).
28 1 NLRB Ann. Rep. 77-84 (1936).
24 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
25 Id. at 34-35.
26 170 N.L.R.B. 1715, 69 L.R.R.M. 1078 (1968).
27 Id. at 1726, 69 L.R.R.M. at —, citing Great Dane as inapposite.
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Since the General Counsel had only proffered evidence to refute the
employer's substantial business justification, the Board dismissed the
section 8(a) (3) charge, stating that he was under an affirmative duty
to prove anti-union motivation."
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Great Dane neglected to
establish guidelines for characterizing employer conduct. In the two
cases in which the Supreme Court has had occasion to apply the Great
Dane standard," the employers had failed to come forward with evi-
dence of substantial and legitimate business justification, so that the
Court avoided characterizing the conduct. The Board in subsequent
cases has found the employer conduct complained of in these two cases
—refusal to pay accrued vacation benefits to strikers and refusal to
reinstate strikers—to be inherently destructive." The Board and the
courts of appeals have also been reluctant to promulgate guidelines
as to whether employer conduct is inherently destructive of employee
rights, but appear to have made determinations on a case-to-case ba-
sis.'" However, employer conduct should be characterized indepen-
dently of the exigencies of a case, thus making guidelines a necessity.
Although the characterization is a substantive finding, it establishes
a procedural result and may be subject to misuse. The characterization
should be predicated solely on the effect of employer conduct and
should measure that quantum of harm in its intensity and permanence.
Unfortunately, the Board has used the characterization more as a con-
'clusion than as an initial finding.
The thrust of Great Dane was to require the employer affirma-
tively to show "legitimate and substantial business justification" 82 for
his conduct, regardless of the General Counsel's ability to prove anti- .
union motivation. Since the employer's conduct leading to the corn-
28 Id.
20 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
80 Northwest Oyster Farms, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 872, 69 L.R.R.M. 1564 (1968)
(refusal to reinstate striker except at reduced wage is inherently destructive conduct);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 27, 65 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1967) (withholding of
holiday benefits from unionized employees is inherently destructive conduct).
81 See, e.g., NLRB v. Darling & Co., 420 F.2d 63, 73 L.R.R.M. 2117 (7th Cir. 1970),
enforcing 170 N.L.R.B. 1068, 68 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1968) (giving severance pay to non-
union employees only following plant shutdown is inherently destructive); NLRB v.
Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d 1306, 70 L.R.R.M. 289 (1st Cir. 1969), enforcing 167
N.L.R.B. 670, 66 L.R.R.M. 1127 (1967) (promise of wage increase before representation
election is conduct having comparatively slight effect); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB,
390 F.2d 338, 67 L.R.R.M. 2708 (9th Cir. 1968), enforcing 160 N.L,R.B. 644, 63 L.R.R.M.
1024 (1966) (investigation and discharge of an employee after he has made a pro-union
statement is inherently destructive conduct) ; Swift Service Stores, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B.
359, 67 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1968) (Christmas bonus conditioned on refraining from strike
activity is inherently destructive conduct).
112 388 U.S. at 34.
1141
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
plaint was affirmative, evidence of his business justification should be
available to him and peculiarly within his knowledge." The business
justification rule of Great Dane is particularly appropriate for deter-
mining when a plant relocation has become a runaway shop. Substan-
tial business justification for relocation may be attributable to increased
business activity, 84 causing a lack of adequate space for expansion"
and an inability to recruit qualified employees in the vicinity." More
often, the justification offered reflects declining business operations,
evidenced by current operating losses" and increased competition."
The place of relocation may offer lower rent and operating costs,"
lower transportation costs for raw or finished materials," better insur-
ance rates, tax advantages, and less vandalism. 41
In plant relocations, an important indication of motivation is the
timing of the move. Since many suspect relocations occur shortly after
certification of a new union or during strike activity, the Board has
found immediate relocation following such action to be evidence of
anti-union motivation." However, it is doubtful that such circumstan-
tial evidence alone would satisfy the burden of proof. In some situa-
tions the employer had already decided to relocate and union activity
forced him to accelerate his plans. The Board has found acceleration
in relocation to violate section 8(a)(3) in itself, absent strong eco-
nomic justification." However, several courts have indicated that
wherever there is economic justification for the move, acceleration
is not an unfair labor practice." The reasoning is that where a deci-
88
 Note, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 213, 219 (1967).
84 See, e.g., NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 48 L.R.R.M. 2658 (2d Cir.
1961).
88 See, e.g., Fraser & Johnston Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259, 81 L.R.R.M. 2964 (9th
Cir. 1972); Cooper Thermometer Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1902, 63 L.R.R.M. 1219 (1966),
enforced in part, 376 F.2d 684, 65 L.R.R.M. 2113 (2d Cir. 1967); Winchester Elec., Inc.,
128 N.L.R.B. 1292, 46 L.R.R.M. 1453 (1960).
86
 See, e.g., Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607, 73 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1969);
Winchester Elec., Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292, 46 L.R.R.M, 1453 (1960).
87 See, e.g., Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607, 73 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1969);
Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965); Brown-McLaren Mfg. Co.,
34 N.L.R.B. 984, 9 L.R.R.M. 50 (1941).
88 See,.e.g., Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607, 73 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1969).
89 See, e.g., Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332, 41 L.R.R.M. 1500 (1958);
Trenton Garment Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1A L.R.R.M. 456 (1938).
49 See, e.g., Winchester Elec., Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 1292, 46 L.R.R.M. 1453 (1960) ;
Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 332, 41 L.R.R.M. 1500 (1958); Brown Truck &
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999,'32 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1953).
41 See, e.g., Plymouth Indus., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 607, 73 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1969).
42
 American Radiator Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 1127, 2 L.R.R.M. 397, enforced, 102 F.2d 974,
4 L.R.R.M. 791 (8th Cir, 1938); Omaha Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 878, 1A L.R.R.M. 399
(1938).
48 See Omaha Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. at 886-87, lA L.R.R.M. at 401-02.
44 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 48 L.R.R.M. 2658 (2d Cir. 1961);
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sion to relocate predated union activity, accelerated relocation to avoid
the probable effects of union organization is justified, 'since unionism
is but another economic consideration faced by an employer in pre-
paring plans for his business operation."
Although the prospect of lower labor costs is ostensibly a valid
business justification," few employers have argued this point in litiga-
tion,47 probably out of fear that they would be contributing to evidence
of anti-union motivation." But dismay over the effects of unionization
is very different from hostility to unionization in terms of the conduct
proscribed by section 8(a) (3). Labor costs are a major consideration,
particularly in companies with low ratios of capital to cost of produc-
tion. Certainly where a union has priced labor out of the reach of
business, it is hypocritical to stifle evidence of the effects of labor
costs on declining profitability. Furthermore, it must be asked: to what
extent should the labor laws prevent an employer who is paying a
standard union wage and earning a reasonable return on his investment
from striving for a better economic, position?
The difficult issue is whether the prospect of lower labor costs
alone could defend an employer from a section 8(a) (3) charge. While
it may be fanciful to suggest that such a factually simple case will
arise, it is submitted that absent affirmative evidence of employer
hostility to the union, a relocation to obtain a cheaper supply of labor
does not violate section 8(a) (3). Certainly an employer paying the
standard union wage to his employees is not exercising bad business
judgment if he relocates to save labor costs and augment his competi-
tive position in the market. Of course it would be to his advantage to
relocate where labor is unorganized since it would be the least restric-
tive as well as the least expensive plant location. Yet to what extent
should public policy insulate unions from the effects of their economic
policies? The unions are free to unionize unorganized workers. If insol-
NLRB v. Houston_Chronide Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848, 33 L.R.R.M. 2847 (5th Cir.
1954).
45 NLRB v. Lansing, 284 F.2d 781, 47 L.R.R.M. 2277 (6th Cir. 1960); cf. Note,
Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1100, 1101 (1964).
46 Eighty-seven percent of the Tennessee employers engaged in apparel and related
industries indicated that cheaper labor was the most important reason for relocating their
plants in that state. Bureau of Business & Economic Research, An Explanation of Plant
Location in Tennessee 196-200 (1966).
47 But see Weltronic Co., 173 N.L.R,B. 235, 69 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1968), enforced, 419
F.2d 1120, 73 L.R.RM. 2014 (6th Cir. 1969); Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R,B. 547,
48 L.R.R.M. 1679 (1961); Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R,B. 999, 32
L.R.R.M. 1580 (1953).
48 Cf. Sheinkman, Plant Removal Under the National Labor Relations Act: Can
Bargaining Be Avoided and Should Bargaining Be Avoided?, 16 N.Y.U. Conf. Lab. 81,
96-97 (1962); but see O'Connell, The Implications of "Decision Bargaining," 16 N.Y.U.
Conf. Lab. 99, 114 (1962).
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vency is a reality for an employer, why should plant relocation to gain
cheaper labor be any less a reality for unions?
B. The Fibreboard Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
v. NLRB" in 1964 was fraught with conflicting dicta. Since the case
was decided, it has been expansively interpreted by the Board and
circumscribed by the courts of appeals. Though Fibreboard was a sub-
contracting case, the Board has applied it in the context of plant relo-
cation." In so doing the Board has lost sight of important policy
considerations.
Factually, Fibreboard was not a difficult case. After completing
a cost-study analysis of its maintenance operation, the employer de-
cided to subcontract that operation for purely monetary considerations.
The union was notified in due time, but the employer refused to bar-
gain concerning the decision to subcontract. The Supreme Court held
that an employer's decision to subcontract, albeit for purely economic
reasons, is a mandatory subject of bargaining with the union." Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, reasoned that the contracting
out of work previously performed by plant employees was within the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment," and was therefore the
subject of mandatory bargaining. But he clearly limited the scope of
that duty to bargain by defining it within the facts of the case, 52 al-
though he suggested that termination of employment was also a condi-
tion of employment: "The words even more plainly cover termination
of employment which, as the facts of this case indicate, necessarily
results from the contracting out of work performed by members of the
established bargaining unit.""
Justices Stewart, Harlan and Douglas were clearly disturbed over
the implications of that dicta. In concurring with the majority's result,
they emphasized the narrow factiial situation in which mandatory bar-
gaining was required, and deplored the breadth of the majority's dicta:
"The Court most assuredly does not decide that every managerial deci-
sion which necessarily terminates an individual's employment is subject
to the duty to bargain. Nor does the Court decide that subcontract-
ing decisions are as a general matter subject to that duty.' More
specifically, the three Justices stressed that management decisions fun-
49 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
5° See, e.g., Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120, 73 L.R.R.M. 2014 (6th Cir.
1969).
51 379 U.S. at 215.
52 Id. at 213.
53 Id. at 210.
54 Id. at 218 (concurring opinion),
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damental to the basic direction of a corporation or those decisions
impinging only indirectly on employment security are not within the
purpose of section 8(d) . 65 Citing Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB,"
in which a relocation without anti-union motivation was held to be
within management prerogative, they implied that the decision to re-
locate was not a mandatory subject of bargaining."
Despite the broad dicta, Chief Justice Warren stressed the prag-
matic approach utilized in reaching the decision under the Fibreboard
factual situation. No capital investment was made, the structure of the
company was static, and the maintenance work still required execution.
In addition, the subcontracting agreement was terminable by either
party on sixty days notice. The Chief Justice was correct in concluding
that under those facts, management's freedom to manage would not be
unduly restricted by a duty to bargain. Furthermore, he stated that
bargaining could possibly be to the benefit of both management and
union since the union might be able to effect cost savings for manage-
ment. He cited the fact that about twenty-five percent of the collective
bargaining agreements in a 1959 survey contained clauses limiting
employer prerogative to subcontract's Yet the very fact that unions
have won the inclusion of clauses limiting subcontracting indicates
their relative strengths and priorities in restricting management pre-
rogative rather than the effectiveness of bargaining concerning sub-
contracting. It is unfair to impose a duty on an employer which the
union could not win through negotiation or which it gave up to obtain
some other concession.
Only recently has a majority of the Board relaxed its decision
bargaining principle in contexts other than subcontracting." Ozark
Trailers, inc.," involving the duty of an employer to decision bargain
with regard to the closing of part of his operation, had summarized
the Board's position that an employer was under a duty to decision
bargain regarding changes affecting employment of the work force.
Although Ozark Trailers involved a plant closing, the Board indicated
that there was no reason to treat plant closings differently from reloca-
55 Id. at 223 (concurring opinion).
50 211 F.2d 365, 374, 33 L.R.R.M. 2742, 2750 (4th Cir. 1954), cited in 379 U.S. at
222.
67 379 U.S. at , 222 (concurring opinion).
68 Id. at 212 n.7. A recent survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that
21% of the 1823 contracts reviewed contained some limitation on plant removal or
shutdown. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept of Labor, Bull. 1425-10, Plant Move-
ment, Transfer and Relocation Allowances, 4 (1969). The rate was 78% in the apparel
industry, where plant relocations arc more frequent than the average for all of the
industries surveyed. Id.
69 See text at note 68 infra.
lw 161 N,L.R.B. 561, 63 L,R.R.M. 1264 (1966).
1145
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tions since the considerations involved were identical." The " Board,
following Fibreboard, found a duty to decision bargain because the
employer's decision resulted in a termination of employment." It
reasoned that the employees' interest in the protection of their liveli-
hood was at least as important as the employer's interest in the protec-
tion of his capital," that many factors prompting the employer's
decision were particularly suitable for resolution through collective
bargaining,04 and that bargaining limited to the impact of the employ-
er's decision could not be meaningful without decision bargaining."
The Board subsequently applied its Ozark Trailers rationale di-
rectly to a plant relocation in McLoughlin Manufacturing Corp." The
employer in that case had decided to terminate operations at his Peru,
Indiana plant because of economic considerations. He informed the
union that he was closing the business entirely, while in reality he
relocated the plant to Uniontown, Alabama. The Board adopted the
trial examiner's finding that since the transaction was a relocation
rather than a complete closing of the business, the employer was re-
quired to bargain over its decision to move as well as its impact on the
employees."
Recently, the Board swept aside its Ozark Trailers rationale in
General Motors Corp." In that case, General Motors (GM) sold a
retail truck dealership in Houston, Texas to Trucks of Texas in a
franchising agreement. GM engaged in impact bargaining with the
union after it became known that Trucks of Texas would not employ
any of the former GM employees. The United Auto Workers, repre-
senting GM's employees at the dealership, alleged that GM had vio-
lated section 8(a) (5) because it had failed to bargain about its decision
to sell prior to the sale of the entity. The Board dismissed the com-
plaint, holding that a decision to sell an enterprise is not a mandatory
subject of bargaining under section 8(a) (5):
We believe, however, that this issue is controlled by the
rationale the courts have generally adopted in closely re-
lated cases, that decisions such as this, in which a significant
investment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope and
ultimate direction of an enterprise, are matters essentially
Si Id. at 569, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1268.
02 Id. at 565, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267.
65
 Id. at 566-67, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1267-68.
04 Id. at 567-68, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1268.
65 Id. at 570, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
66 182 N.L.R.B. 958, 74 L.R.R.M 1756 (1970).
61' Id. at 965, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1759.
68 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Local 864, UAW
v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 81 L.R.R.M. 2439 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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financial and managerial in nature. They thus lie at the very
core of entreprenurial control, and are not the types of sub-
jects which Congress intended to encompass within 'rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment.' 62
The Board's decision is significant in several respects. First, it
recognized the previous divergence between its decisions and those
of the courts of appeals regarding decision bargaining, and opted to
abandon its previous line of reasoning. Second, the Board could have
rested its decision on the fact that it had never decided whether deci-
sion bargaining was required in the context of the sale of an enterprise.
Instead, the Board broke with its own precedent and repudiated
mandatory decision bargaining over decisions " 'at the core of entre-
preneurial control.'"" Finally, the Board implied that it was conceding
that decision bargaining is indeed restrictive of managerial functions.
It stated that even though management decisions affect employment
security, employees and their representatives are unlikely to be familiar
with operational considerations and can substantially impede manage-
ment at a time when it needs secrecy and freedom of action."
The last consideration is perhaps the most important, since it
marks the first departure from Chief Justice Warren's proposition in
Fibreboard that decision bargaining is not unduly restrictive of man-
agement,72 and from the Board's own dicta in Ozark Trailers that no
significant intrusion upon management prerogative is created by re-
quiring management to bargain over its decision to relocate or terminate
part of its business when it has reached the stage of serious considera-
tion of a move."
The General Motors decision has extremely significant implications
in the context of plant relocations. Decision bargaining is at least as
restrictive of management in a relocation as in the sale of the business
in General Motors. A decision to relocate by an employer usually results
from a complex economic analysis." Consequently, the decision must
account for many factors other than the costs to employers of wages
and conditions of employment. Because the cost of labor is but one
factor in the relocation matrix, mandatory decision bargaining to ex-
plore the possibility of eliminating the necessity for the relocation by
reducing labor costs would delay and impede implementation of a
60 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 379 U.S. at 213.
73 161 N.L.R.B. at 569, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
74 See text at notes 12-15 supra.
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relocation which was caused only in part by labor conditions, yet which
requires speed and efficiency.
The Board has failed to consider the ramifications of decision
bargaining in the relocation context. Since decision bargainnig becomes
futile after a relocation has occurred, employers are encouraged to re-
locate without notice to employees or unions in order to avoid the duty
to bargain.75
 A further inducement to a runaway shop is the Board's
ruling in Ozark Trailers that an employer must notify the union "once
he has reached the point of thinking seriously about taking such an
extraordinary step as relocating . . . ."" Although the Board felt that
this requirement would not restrict management, in fact it requires
notification and subsequent bargaining as soon as the possibility of
relocation ripens into a prospect. Yet the employer is not in a position
to negotiate until his plans have taken concrete form. He may need to
initiate studies, hire consultants and discuss the merits of relocation at
several board meetings.77
 When relocation is a mere possibility the
employer would be unprepared to deal with the union. Although the
employer is obligated to notify the union before his decision to relocate
becomes irreversible, at the earliest that duty should not arise until he
is prepared to finalize his plans."
The timing for notification of relocation is critical to the employer.
Disclosure results in the loss of flexibility which secrecy had provided,
and may affect the employer's competitive position in the market. He
also risks low morale among employees, causing a failure to meet pro-
duction quotas. Additionally, the employer is under a duty to supply the
union with relevant information relating to the subjects of bargaining."
Though the scope of that information is subject to dispute, the Board
75
 Relocation without notification is an independent 8(a) (5) violation. Rome Products
Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 22 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1948).
76
 161 N.L.R.B. at 569, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1269.
77 R. Reed, Jr., Plant Location, Layout, and Maintenance 10 (1967):
The responsibility for decisions on location selection and facility planning rests
with top management. However, top management must delegate the details to
specialists including market researchers, economists, engineers, operations re-
searchers, and perhaps financial analysts, sociologists, and others. The principal
analyst must coordinate the activities of a diverse group, acting as a collector
of facts and a maker of unbiased plans while delving into economics and proba-
bilities to assure that the final result is both feasible and practical. The location,
operation, and organization constitute an integrated system each component of
which affects and in turn is affected by the other components. It is imperative
therefore that the principal coordinator apply rules and techniques of systems
analysis and design in order to balance interactions to optimize the effectiveness
of the complete system rather than of the components piecewise.
78 Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for
Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 803, 833
(1971).
78
 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967) ; NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,
351 U.S. 149 (1956).
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has in the past ordered the employer to supply the union with data con-
cerning job classifications, the work force, and conditions of employ-
ment at the new plant." This information may also be instrumental to
the union in bringing an unfair labor practice charge against the em-
ployer.
There is no recognition in Board decisions of the practical consid-
erations entailed in mandating decision bargaining in a relocation case.
Decision bargaining may be used as a subterfuge by unions to wrest
concessions from the employer, thereby insuring the survival and con-
tinuity of the union at the sacrifice of employee welfare—in a word,
leverage. Aside from wage considerations, management needs flexibility
in arranging its operations at the new plant, and an uncooperative union
could hamstring it from the outset. Although the employer cannot
discriminate against union members in hiring employees at the new
plant,' it is obviously to the employer's advantage to have a non-union
shop. In order to gain recognition at the new plant or the employment
of strong union adherents there, the union may be willing to make
concessions on employee benefits which might have been won for those
workers who cannot, or choose not to, transfer to the new plant. Since
it would be bad faith for an employer to relocate while still decision
bargaining with the union," a union may jeopardize the economy of an
employer's relocation by unnecessarily stalling in its bargaining tactics.
Thus, in order to maintain a profitable position, the employer may be
induced to breach section 8 (a) (2 ) 8R by offering to support the union and
recognize it at the new plant."
On the whole, the courts of appeals have effectuated the guidelines
suggested by Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard. Re-
cently the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Board's General
Motors decision." The decision was written by Justice Clark, sitting
by designation, who was a member of the majority in Fibreboard. He
reiterated that the Fibreboard decision was limited to its facts and did
not expand the scope of mandatory decision bargaining to employer
decisions fundamental to the operation of the business." In addition, he
80 Cooper Thermometer Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1902, 1918, 63 L.R.R.M. 1219, — (1966).
Refusal to supply relevant information is not a per se violation of good faith under
§ 8(a)(5), but it is weighty proof. Section of Lab. Rel. Law, Am. Bar Ms'n, The
Developing Labor Law 318-20 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as C. Morris].
et 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
82 Cf. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 568, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1268.
88
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
84 Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 174 N.L.R.B. 636, 70 L.R.R.M. 1255 (1969),
where the union brought an unfair labor practice charge when the employer breached
an "understanding" that the union would automatically be recognized at any new
facility.
86 Local 864, UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 81 L,R.R.M. 2439 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
86 Id. at 424, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2441.
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expressed the fear that a further extension of the decision bargaining
principle would amount to labor's usurpation of management func-
tions.87
 Three other appellate decisions illustrate the application of the
Fibreboard fundamental change test in the relocation context.
In ILGWU v. NLRB," the District of Columbia Circuit enforced
the Board's decision in McLoughlin Manufacturing Corp.," imposing
a duty on the employer to decision bargain about a move from Indiana
to Alabama. In applying the Fibreboard doctrine, the court failed to
consider whether the relocation entailed a fundamental change in the
employer's operations. Instead, it incorrectly substituted a determina-
tion that the scope of the enterprise had not been altered by the move,
taking into account the enterprise's customers, type of business, and
management,°° but failing to consider the effect on the enterprise of the
distance involved in the relocation and its effect on the work force, and
failing to consider the capital investment by the employer involved in
the relocation.°1 In Weltronic Co. v. NLRB," the employer moved a
central operation from one plant to another three miles away, but re-
fused to transfer employees to the new plant in order to keep it non-
union. This resulted in the loss of fourteen employees at the old plant.
In enforcing the Board's order of decision bargaining, the Sixth Circuit
implicitly rejected the employer's claim that the relocation was a
fundamental change within his management prerogative." The ap-
parent bad faith of the employer in attempting to keep the new plant
nonunion and the subsequent relocation of the operation 130 miles
away while litigation was pending may have been motivating factors
for the court. However, the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of a
decision bargaining order in NLRB v. Acme Industrial Products,94
where the employer had built a new plant forty miles away and had
engaged in impact bargaining with the union. The court held that
neither Weltronic nor Fibreboard stood for an absolute duty to bargain
concerning management decisions which resulted in the termination of
employment." However, the Acme court did not articulate the rationale
that decision bargaining is not required concerning a fundamental
87
 Id.
88
 463 F.2d 907, 80 L.R.R.M. 2716 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
89
 182 N.L.R.B. 958, 74 L.R.R.M. 1756 (1970).
go 463 F.2d at 916-17, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2722-23.
91
 This final factor was cited in Fibreboard as an important consideration in deter-
mining whether the management decision was fundamental to the direction of the com-
pany. 379 U.S. at 213.
92
 419 F.2d 1120, 73 L.R.R.M. 2014 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970).
08
 Id. at 1123, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2015-16.
84 439 F.2d 40, 76 L.R.R.M. 2697 (6th Cir. 1971).
98 Id. at 42, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
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change in the enterprise; it merely stated that the Board was attempting
to extend too broadly the Fibreboard and Weltronic holdings, which
were both limited to the specific facts in each case."
In both Weltronic and Acme, . the Sixth Circuit ignored the sugges-
tion of the Board in Ozark Trailers that the fundamental interests of
employees in their jobs justify the imposition upon the employer of a
duty to bargain about a relocation decision even though relocation is
a fundamental change in the business. This would seem to indicate ad-
herence in the relocation context to the rule set forth in Fibreboard
that decision bargaining is not required in the case of a fundamental
change." Though not every relocation involves such a fundamental
change or a reinvestment of capital," it would seem that a removal to
a new location a substantial distance from the original site and a major
investment in a new physical plant are factors indicating that the re-
location involves a fundamental change. Hence, at least in many plant
relocations, decision bargaining would seem not to be required by the
Fibreboard decision.
Moreover, the General Motors case has created an atmosphere more
hospitable to the exigencies of decision bargaining. It seems clear that,
after General Motors, despite the lack of an explicit articulation of the
theory in the Acme decision, the Board and courts will not require
decision bargaining regarding plant relocation where there is evidence
that the move is a fundamental change in the business entity. Also, the
Board should be receptive to arguments that decision bargaining would
unduly restrict management in effecting the relocation. Unfortunately,
this line of reasoning fails to come to grips with the nature of plant
relocation. The runaway shop is a highly infrequent phenomenon in
labor relations, but it is highly visible when it occurs. The vast majority
of plant relocations are by definition basic changes in companies and
thoroughly unsuitable for decision bargaining because of predominantly
non-labor considerations. Hence, recognition of the consequent inap-
propriateness of decision bargaining over plant relocation is both prac-
tical and realistic.
96
 Id. Other circuits dealing with analogous situations of subcontracting and partial
closings have interpreted Fibreboard not to require decision bargaining whenever the
management decision involved a fundamental change in the business or a reinvestment
of capital. NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 70 L.R.R.M. 2418 (10th Cir.
1969) (plant closing) ; NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 65
L.R.R.M. 2861 (9th Cir. 1967) (termination and relocation as partner in a joint
venture) ; NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033 (3d
Cir. 1965) (plant closing) ; NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084
(8th Cir. 1965) (subcontracting).
9T 379 U.S. at 213, 223. See text at note 86 supra.
us See, e.g., Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1120, 73 L.R.R.M. 2014 (6th Cir. 1969).
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C. Post-Purchase Relocation
Purchasers of established businesses on occasion relocate their
acquisitions immediately after purchase. The reasons for post-purchase
relocation may vary from attempting to improve the geographical ad-
vantages of a marginal or failing business to bringing an operation in
closer proximity to the purchaser's residence. Although the purchaser
and previous owner have not engaged in a discriminatory relocation,
the purchaser may be obligated to recognize and bargain with the
union representing his predecessor's employees as the representative of
employees at the new location," and abide by the arbitration clause in
the previous owner's collective bargaining agreement.'" These duties
arise whenever the purchaser is deemed a successor to the previous
owner. "Successorship," as employed by the Board and courts, is a
term of art "involv[ing] a judgment that the employing industry has
remained essentially the same despite the change in ownership. 710'
Member Fanning of the NLRB has listed seven considerations to aid
in the determination of successorship, 102 and these have gained Board
approval: 'm
(1) Whether there has been a substantial continuity of
the same business operations;
(2) whether the new employer uses the same plant;
(3) whether he has the same or substantially the same
work force;	 •
(4) whether the same jobs exist under the same working
conditions;
(5) whether he employs the same supervisors;
(6) whether he employs the same machinery, equip-
ment, and methods of production; and
(7) whether he manufactures the same product or
offer [s] the same services.
The successorship doctrine evolved in static location cases where
the purchaser merely operated the business at the same location as his
predecessor. However, the doctrine should be flexibly applied to post-
°° NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). For a detailed
discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in Burns, see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 193 (1972).
roo John Wiley & Sons, Inc, v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). For a thorough
analysis of a successor's obligations, see generally Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations
of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 735 (1969).
101
 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 349, 74
L.R.R.M. 1098, 1100 (1970).
102 Fanning, The Purchaser and the Labor Contract — An Escalating Theory, 1967
Lab. Rd. Yearbook 284, 286.
199
 J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216 (1972).
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purchase relocations. While the Board may list as a factor in successor-
ship questions whether the purchaser utilizes the same plant, its em-
phasis is not on the significance of the geographical location as an
economic necessity for the business (which is the important question
in relocation cases), but on the identity and allocation of working area,
suitability of the plant to employees and its convenience for commuting.
Although a purchaser might attempt to bar a union from his relocated
operation by failing to hire his predecessor's employees, he violates
section 8(a) (3) only if he discriminates against union members in his
hiring practices.'"
Successorship should not be imposed in the context of a post-
purchase relocation unless a majority of employees have been retained
by the purchaser in the new location; 105
 the duties of recognition, bar-
gaining and observance of the predecessor's arbitration agreement
should not be incumbent upon a purchaser where a majority of his
current employees have not supported the union as their bargaining
agent. The transfer of a majority of the predecessor's employees to the
newly located business entity should be a threshold finding to any im-
position of successorship on the purchaser. In Local 57, ILGWU v.
NLRB (GarwinCorp.), 1" the employer feigned a sale of his garment
plant and relocated it from New York City to Miami, Florida, to
escape the effects of the recent unionization of his employees. The
Board had previously found the relocation to be discriminatory and the
sale a sham. 107
 At issue before the District of Columbia Circuit was
whether the Board could order the employer to recognize and bargain
with the union in the New York plant as the representative of the
Miami employees. The court held that the Board could not order the
employer to recognize and bargain with the union certified in the
original location unless a majority of former employees were expected
to transfer to the new plant. Circuit Judge Burger reasoned for the
majority that the policy of the Act was to grant workers their freedom
of choice in selecting a bargaining representative.'" To impose a
bargaining representative on the new employees would not promote
industrial peace and would violate one of the basic policies of the Act.
However, the retention of a majority of employees alone should
not be enough to subject a purchaser to the duties incumbent on a suc-
cessor. Justice Rehnquist convincingly made this argument in his
104 Cf. Asheville-Whitney Nursing Home, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 76 L.R.R.M. 1242
(1971) ; Barrington Plaza & Tragniew, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 962, 75 L.R.R.M. 1226 (1970).
100 Goldberg, supra note 100, at 795: "Thus, it is a sine qua non to successorship
that a majority of the alleged successor's work force, at the time the union seeks to
compel bargaining, be comprised of a majority of the predecessor's employees."
106 374 F.2d 295, 64 L.R.R.M. 2159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967).
1 °7 Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965).
108
 374 F.2d at 301, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2162.
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dissent in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.'" In
that case Lockheed awarded to Burns a protection services contract
which had previously been held by Wackenhut Corporation. Burns
retained twenty-seven of Wackenhut's employees in its force of forty-
two. The Wackenhut employees had been represented by United Plant
Guard Workers (UPG), which now claimed that Burns, as Wacken-
hut's successor, must recognize it and abide by its collective bargaining
agreement with Wackenhut. The majority held that while Burns must
recognize UPG, it was under no obligation to accept the terms of the
agreement between UPG and Wackenhut."'
Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justices Burger,
Brennan and Powell, contended that Burns was not a successor to
Wackenhut. The majority scrupulously avoided that issue, apparently
accepting the Board's finding of successorship or judging that, like the
question of appropriate bargaining unit, it had not been preserved on
appeal."' The Board had accepted the trial examiner's findings of
successorship based on the transfer of a majority of employees and the
unchanged nature of the business." 2
 But Justice Rehnquist argued that
Burns was not a successor where there was no transfer of assets, either
tangible or intangible, and that the retention of employees alone should
not subject an employer to successorship." 8
It would seem that the imposition of successorship in Burns was
inequitable. Burns did not succeed to Wackenhut's business as the
Board argued, for they were in the same business; Burns merely took
over Wackenhut's former account and had no dealings whatsoever with
Wackenhut. Furthermore, Burns did not anticipate the role of suc-
cessor or having to deal with UPG. Though Burns knew that the UPG
was certified in the Wackenhut unit," 4
 this knowledge does not seem to
be a sufficient basis for imposing a successorship obligation. While
Burns was remiss in recognizing the American Federation of Guards
before ascertaining that it represented a majority of workers, Burns did
not foresee having to recognize UPG without even a card check.
Justice Rehnquist was most concerned about the expansion of the
successorship doctrine so that the mere retention of a majority of em-
100 406 U.S. at 296-310. Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion both concurred and
dissented on specific issues with that of the majority, it will be referred to as the dis-
senting opinion here.
110 Id. at 286-87.
111 Id. at 278, 298.
112 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. at 353, 74 L.R.R.M.
at 1098, 1100.
112
 "The fact that the employees in the Instant case continued to perform their
work at the same situs, while not irrelevant to analysis, cannot be deemed controlling."
406 U.S. at 308 (dissenting opinion).
114
 Id. at 275.
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ployees by the new employer would satisfy the Board's substantial
continuity test. While his dissenting opinion suggests that he would be
willing to find a successor relationship where a new employer purchases
the assets of the former employer, it is more significantly an indication
of an attitude among a bloc of four justices to apply the successorship
doctrine more restrictively in the future. Moreover, such a posture by
the dissenting justices may well lead, in post-purchase relocation cases,
to the necessity of showing greater continuity of operation than has
previously been required by the Board and the courts in order to invoke
the successorship doctrine against a new employer.
As Justice Rehnquist recognized, successorship is an "admittedly
imprecise concept.'"" Speculation and uncertainty abound as to the
Board's determination of successorship in plant relocations, which still
proceeds on a case-by-case basis. The Board's obligation to protect
employees must be balanced by a duty not to impede normal economic
development. For businessmen making large investments into com-
mercial entities, the risk of being deemed successors will prevent poten-
tial purchasers from employing their capital to achieve economic
adjustment in marginal ventures. The purchaser of a business usually
undertakes a larger investment than the sale price of the operation.
The assets of production from the former entity may be the focus of the
new operation, but the purchaser may contemplate a different product
or processing method.'" The good will and lines of supply and distribu-
tion of the old entity may be of limited or no value to the purchaser.
When the purchaser must speculate as to his profitabilty based on un-
certain wage rates and conditions of employment, and a decline in
operating flexibility—all of which accompany a finding of successor-
ship—the marginal venture becomes a dangerous proposition.
The uncertainty of the Board's case-by-case approach is illustrated
by the case of West Suburban Transit Lines, lnc.lit An insolvent bus
line was purchased from a receiver, and the terminal relocated fifteen
miles away. The purchaser maintained identical routes, schedules and
fares, and retained fifty-two of the sixty-one former employees. How-
115 Id. at 299 (dissenting opinion).
115 See, e.g., Apex Record Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 333, 64 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1.966), in
which the Board held a purchaser not to be a successor where the purchaser had taken
over his predecessor's record production plant but produced records for a different purpose
and for a different market.
117 158 N.L.R.B. 794, 62 L.R.R.M. 110 (1966). Compare Pargament Fidler, Inc., 173
N.L.R.B. 696, 69 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1968), in which a printing shop was sold and relocated
from Manhattan to Brooklyn but only 10 of the 31 former employees were retained. The
purchaser continued in the same line of business, sold to his predecessor's customers, em-
ployed the predecessor to manage the operation, but only purchased part of the pre-
decessor's assets. Though the Board held that the purchaser was not the alter ego of his
predecessor, it did find a succcssorship relationship notwithstanding the fact that less than
a majority of the employees were retained.
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ever, he also initiated a chartering service accounting for twenty per-
cent of his gross revenue, replaced forty percent of the fleet with new
buses and hired additional employees. The Board found the purchaser
to be a successor employer because of the substantial continuity in the
business. Yet it failed to consider the purchaser's economic adjustment
in rehabilitating a failing business, the new capital investment or the
change in the business' direction. Consequently, it neglected to consider
that businessmen will normally be hesitant to incur substantial risk by
investing in a venture when their labor law obligations are at best
uncertain. The Board's definition of successorship, apparently sustained
by the Court in Burns, discourages necessary economic adjustments in
marginal ventures.
Occasionally post-purchase relocations have been employed to
thwart unionism in the orignial business entity. Characteristically,
where this has occurred, the purchaser has retained every aspect of
the former business so that successorship, except for the transfer of
employees, is easily found 118
 A credible showing that a majority of
employees would have transferred but for employer discrimination
would be sufficient alternative proof to aid in the successorship deter-
mination."9
 Yet it is easy to overplay the incidence of discriminatory
post-purchase relocations. They are only feasible in industries with
low ratios of capital to cost of production. If former employees are
skilled, it is unlikely that a purchaser could afford not to retain them.
A discriminatory post-purchase relocation is an extraordinary step for
an employer to take, and is usually indicative of a declining industry
or a union imposing artificial wage levels.
Where the successor employer in a post-purchase relocation is
found to be the alter ego of his predecessor, both are held liable to
remedy the unlawful relocation. 120 Alter ego is a finding that the suc-
cessor is really just the predecessor in disguise. The Board will not
permit unfair labor practices to go unremedied where the employer has
merely changed his outward form. Important considerations include
continuity in the shareholders and officers, assets, operations, employees
and supervisory force."' In addition, the Board often looks to deter-
mine if fair compensation was tendered for the business. In Hopwood
118 See, e.g., Intergraphic Corp. of America, 160 N.L.R.B. 1284, 63 L.R.R.M. 1205
(1966), in which the purchaser was controlled by the predecessor and had merely
relocated the production assets from Queens to Manhattan without changing the final
product or customers.
110 Fraser & Johnston Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259, 81 L.R.R.M. 2964 (9th Cir.
1972).
120 See, e.g., NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 913, 34 L.R.R.M.
2844, — (8th Cir. 1954).
121
 Atlanta Paper Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 125, 42 L.R.R.M. 1309 (1958) ; C. Morris,
supra note 80, at 375.
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Retinning Co.,122
 a post-purchase relocation, the Board found a sham
sale where only $23,000 was paid for an operation doing about $622,000
of business per year.'" However, there may be unusual circumstances
where a finding of alter ego would be unjustified. For example, the
infusion of new capital into a company or the development of a new
product line would be primary economic justification overshadowing
any residual anti-union motivation. An illustration of this is Diaper
Jean Manufacturing Co.,' 24
 in which the Board held that where the
principal shareholders formed a successor company at a new location,
brought in new capital, and new shareholders held one-third of the
stock, there could be no finding of alter ego.'
Since alter ego is not difficult to prove, cases employing the sham
have dwindled in recent years. 12" Of more significance are cases of
successor employers purchasing with knowledge of their predecessor's
unlawful motive in effecting relocations. In New Madrid Manufacturing
Co.127
 the Board held that where the successor employer had knowledge
of his predecessor's unlawful motive for relocation, the successor was
also liable to remedy the violations of labor law." The Eighth Circuit
took exception to this reasoning, stating: " [T] here must be some basis
of theory, reason and justice for subjecting a successor, who is so in
both law and fact, to a responsibility for his predecessor's acts, beyond
the mere naked circumstance of his constituting a purchaser."'" Yet
the court affirmed the Board's holding on the grounds that the successor
employer had participated in the original employer's unfair labor
practices. The purchaser in New Madrid had been the manager of his
predecessor's business, so his participation was central in both planning
and execution. Under the court's rationale, notice without participation
is not enough to incur successorship obligations. However, the Fifth
Circuit has more recently held, in United States Pipe & Foundry Co.
v. NLRB (Perma Vinyl), 1 " that a bona fide purchaser with knowledge
of his predecessor's unfair labor practices is liable for remedying them
under the successorship theory. The Board has subsequently applied
the Perma Vinyl doctrine in static location casesl`" although the issue
has not arisen in a post-purchase relocation. The Board is likely to
insist, on the basis of the static location cases, that notice of the prede-
1142 4 N.L.R.B. 922, IA L.R.R.M. 416 (1938).
123 Id. at 934, lA L.R.R.M. at 417-18.
124 109 N.L.R.B. 1045,34 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1954).
123 Id. at 1049-50, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1507-08.
120 Gordon, Legal Questions of successorship, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 280, 292 (1969).
127 104 N.L.R.B. 117, 32 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1953).
1 228 Id. at 118, 32 L.R.R.M. at 1061.9 2
F.2d at 914-15, 34 L.R.R.M. at 2849.
130
 398 F.2d 544, 548, 68 L.R.R.M. 2913, 2915 (5th Cir. 1968).
131
 See Associated Transp. Co. of Texas, Inc., 194 N.L.R,B. No. 12, 78 L.R.R.M.
1678 (1971); Golden State Bottling Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 142, 76 1.,,R,12.M. 1868 (1971).
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cessor's illegal motive is sufficient to bind the successor to remedy a
discriminatory relocation since the successor was the beneficiary of the
conduct and solely able to remedy the violation by ordering reinstate-
ment. Yet it is inequitable to penalize the purchaser for taking advan-
tage of the bargain offered to him unless his motive was more direct and
substantial in aiding his predecessor.
Post-purchase relocations pose problems requiring a special ap-
plication of the successorship doctrine. Only in unusual circumstances
confined to specific industries is a post-purchase relocation feasible for
discriminatory reasons. Since discriminatory relocations are frequently
at less than arm's length and reasonably simple to prove, unions and
their members are adequately protected by an application of the
successorship doctrine that does not impose serious restrictions on the
employer whose motives are economically justified. The purpose of the
labor laws should not be to protect employees at the sacrifice of eco-
nomic development.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Burns is persuasive that, standing
alone, majority retention in the new entity is not sufficient to sustain a
finding of successorship. The implication is that the amount of proof
needed to substantiate successorship will be greater in the future, and
the fact that four members of the Court concurred in an opinion on a
subject which the majority never reached is an important omen for
policy in this area of the law. The dissent in Burns recognizes that suc-
cessorship is intertwined with economic considerations as well as em-
ployee protection. The retention of a majority of employees may be
altruism for employees, or it may be merely for the purchaser's con-
venience. In the context of post-purchase relocation, successorship can
hinder and impede a purchaser who had contemplated changes in the
operation.
D. The Impact of H. K. Porter on NLRB Remedies
I. The H. K. Porter Decision
The Board is under an affirmative duty to issue remedies whenever
it finds violations of the Act. 132 The language of the Taft-Hartley Actm
132 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), the applicable portion of which states that:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging
in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact
and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay,
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act] • . . .
See also NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 262 (1969); UAW v.
NLRB, 427 F.2d 1330, 74 L.R.R.M. 2481 (6th Cir. 1970),
133 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
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vests the Board with broad discretion in fashioning remedies,'" and
it has been so interpreted by the courts.'" In fashioning remedies the
Board has several guidelines: first, the award must be remedial and
not punitive; 1" second, the remedy must effectuate the policies of the
Act.'"
A third guideline was recently handed down by the Supreme Court
in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB.'" There the union charged the employer
with failing to bargain in good faith regarding a checkoff clause. The
Board had found bad faith in the employer's refusal to bargain over
the clause') and this was affirmed by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.'" The employer then offered to discuss alternatives to the check-
off clause, such as permitting the union to collect dues in the plant, but
the union at that point insisted on the checkoff clause, Finding an addi-
tional refusal to bargain in good faith in a supplemental order on motion
of the union for a clarification of the earlier opinion, the Board ordered
the employer to accept the checkoff clause,'" and the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed.'" The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the Board "is without power to compel a company or a union to agree
to any substantive contractual provision of a collective-bargaining
agreement."'"
The scope of the holding in Porter is not entirely clear. Justice
Black, writing for the majority, carefully limited the impact of the
Court's decision on other Board remedies by stating: "The _parties to
the instant case are agreed that this is the first time in the 35-year
history of the Act that the Board has ordered either an employer or a
union to agree to a substantive term of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment."'" However, this dictum was probably intended to prohibit the
retroactive application of the case rather than to limit its scope. While
it can be argued that Porter should be limited to its specific facts,
namely a prospective mandatory subject of bargaining already proposed
by one party to the negotiations, the broad impact of the case has a sig-
nificant effect on policy considerations. In passing section 8 ((IV"
131 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), quoted in pertinent part in note 132 supra.
125 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
125 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
137 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
138 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
150 H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 59 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1965).
11° United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272, 62 L.R.R.M. 2204
(D.C. Cir. 1966).'
141 H.K. Porter Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 966, 68 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1968) (Supp. Dec. &
Order).
142 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123, 71 L.R.R.M. 2207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
148 397 U.S. at 102.
144 Id. at 106.
145 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
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Congress intended that the NLRB not mandate the terms of bargaining
agreements."' This basic policy consideration overrides the Board's
duty to fashion remedies for violations of the Act, for in carrying out
the terms of the Act, the Board may not undermine the fundamental
purposes of the Act. 147 Justice Black recognized that freedom of con-
tract is slightly restrained by the Act, but stated that its purpose is
merely supervision of procedure and not compulsion of terms."'
Porter, if read expansively, casts doubt on some of the remedies
used by the Board in redressing employer unfair labor practices in the
context of plant relocations. The Board has long recognized that this is
a particularly difficult area in which to achieve status quo ante." 9 The
primary effect of a relocation without prior notice to the union is to
terminate the union's status as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployer's employees unless a majority are rehired at the new plant. In
addition, before the relocation actually occurs, it destroys the prestige
and bargaining leverage of the union. Frustrated in being able to effect
equitably its objective of status quo ante, 15° the Board has embarked
on a series of remedies—including reinstatement, back pay, a make-
whole order, and travel and moving expenses—now suspect under the
Porter holding; and several remedies which, while not falling within
the prohibition of Porter, at the same time do not effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.
Reinstatement and back pay are specifically authorized by section
10(c) of the Act.15 ' The Board may order the employer in a relocated
plant to reinstate his discharged employees to substantially equivalent
employment at the new site.' 52
 Aside from serious problems with the
140 The applicable portion of § 8(d) states that:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith .. but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession. . . [Emphasis added.)
147 397 U.S. at 108.
148 Id .
149 Cf. Brown, Exploring the World of Remedies, 1967 Lab. ReI. Yearbook 251, 258;
McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies under Section 8(a) (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 1968 Lab. Rel. Yearbook 114, 121-22.
150 The Board has the power, which it has never used, to make an unconditional
order that the employer return the plant to the original location. See text at note 184
infra. Restoring the status quo would, in most instances, have such a severe economic
effect on the employer that it would be an inequitable remedy to impose on the employer;
and it might even be considered a punitive rather than a remedial measure, which is
proscribed by the Act. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
151
 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), quoted in pertinent part in note 132 supra.
152 Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937, 7 L.R.R.M. 18, enforced as modified,
116 F.2d 281, 7 L.R.R.M. 658 (8th Cir. 1940).
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adequacy of this remedy in a relocation case, there is the difficulty of
interpreting "substantially equivalent employment." The Board has
held that the requirement entails restoring the employees to their
former position with regard to wages, working conditions and senior-
ity.'" However, the existing collective bargaining agreement has no
application to the new plant site; 154 if the employees at the new plant
are organized, a new bargaining contract has to be negotiated between
the employer and the representative of the employees at the new loca-
tion. Hence, in prescribing that the old wage rates and working condi-
tions are to exist at the new plant, the Board is setting the terms and
conditions for prospective employment at the new plant in disregard of
the Porter holding."'
Back pay poses problems similar to reinstatement. While it is
conceded that the Board may order back pay as a remedy for any
employer unfair labor practice, the question in a plant relocation is the
rate at which it should be paid. It would be unjust enrichment to enforce
a back pay order at a higher rate of pay than the employer would have
agreed to pay to employees at the new plant.'" If the move had an eco-
nomic motivation, back pay at the old rate of pay might impose an
intolerable burden upon the employer; and since back pay continues to
accrue during litigation, the ultimate award may cripple or bankrupt a
company, thus decreasing or eliminating employment."' Under section
8(d), the rate of pay should not be Board-imposed, but the parties
should arrive at the figure through independent bargaining.'"
158 Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 16 N.L,R.B. 727, 5 L.R.R.M. 265 (1939),
enforced, 119 F.2d 903, 8 L.R.R.M. 824 (8th Cir. 1941).
154 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 951-52, 55 L.R.R.M. 2249, 2253-54 (2d
Cir.), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964) ; Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143,
149, 50 L.R.R.M. 2763, 2768 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962). But see
Riffling Corp,, 203 N.L,R.B. No. 59, 83 L.R.R.M. 1190 (1973), in which the Board
applied the former contract to employees at the new location by analogizing to the
same considerations as successorship.
155 This problem in providing substantially equivalent employment in a plant
relocation is aggravated by the fact that high labor costs may have been an important
consideration in relocating.
The Second Circuit had ruled on the basis of § 8(d) even before Porter that the
Board could not order reinstatement under the former terms of employment since the
terms and conditions of future employment are appropriately the subject of collective
bargaining. Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684, 690, 65 L.R.R.M. 2113,
2118 (2d Cir. 1967).
160 Id. at 691, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2119.
151 See Adams Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 108, 115, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2090
(8th Cir. 1965).
158 Fraser & Johnston. Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259, 81 L,R.R,M. 2964 (9th Cir.
1972); Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 684, 65 L.R.R.M. 2113. (2d Cir.
1967).
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In several recent cases, of which the best known are Tiidee Prod-
ucts, Inc.'" and Ex-Cell-0 Corp.,1" unions have sought make-whole
orders of back pay at rates which the employers would have paid
absent their refusal to bargain in good faith. The unions claimed that
employers frequently bargain in bad faith to delay bargaining by unfair
practice litigation since litigation is often less expensive than aggregate
wage increases demanded by unions,'" and because protracted delays
in bargaining without results weaken unions and frequently cause them
a loss of majority status. 162
 The District of Columbia Circuit has been
sympathetic to the make-whole remedy, and it held in International
Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB (Tiidee) 163 that the Board could
issue a make-whole back pay order on the basis of the wage rate which
the employer and the union would have agreed upon if the employer had
not refused to bargain. The court rested its decision on the .anti-union
animus of the employer,'" which—rather than a test of the Board's
certification of the union—was the basis for his refusal to bargain. The
District of Columbia Circuit later modified its theory justifying make-
whole orders by allowing such orders only when the employer's refusal
to bargain was patently frivolous as opposed to a situation in which the
employer was motivated by at least arguable objections to the union's
certification."' However, the make-whole remedy is seriously incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Porter. As a majority of the
Board recognized in rejecting the make-whole order in its Ex-Cell-0
decision, such a remedy would be the imposition of contract terms on
the parties in violation of section 8 (d). 1" In addition, the remedy
would be punitive and would have a chilling effect on the employer's
right to litigate labor cases. The Board would be called upon to formu-
late a viable distinction between frivolous and good faith litigation as
well as to calculate retrospective wage rates, which at best would be
159 174 N.L.R.B. 705, 70 L.R.R.M. 1346 (1969), remanded sub nom. International
Union of Elm Workers v. NLRB (Tiidee), 426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
100
 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970), enforcement denied sub nom.
UAW v. NLRB (Ex-Cell-0), 449 F.2d 1046, 76 L.R.R.M. 2753 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
161 Cf. Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal to
Bargain Cases, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 1059 (1968).
162 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
1347, 1452 (1972).
163 426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
164 Id. at 1247-48, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
10a 441 F.2d 1027, 1035-36, 76 L.R.R.M, 2033, 2039 (D.C. Cir. 1970), aff`g Levi
Strauss & Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 415, 72 L.R.R.M. 1632 (1969) (2d Supp. Dec.); United
Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 519, 521, 74 L.R.R.M. 2747, 2749 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
166
 Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 185 N.L.R.B, 107, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970).
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speculative.'" This was the Board's rationale in again rejecting the
make-whole order in its second Tiidee Products decision on remand
from the court of appeals.'"
The make-whole remedy has little sustenance remaining. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit is the only court to sanction the remedy, and
that court has limited its use to instances of frivolous litigation by
employers. The conflict with Porter is very real since it was the District
of Columbia Circuit's decision that the Supreme Court reversed in
Porter. Only two retired Board members have favored the use of the
remedy,' while those in opposition to it remain on the Board.' 7°
Frequently the Board orders travel and moving expenses in reloca-
tion cases to implement its reinstatement order. Its reasoning is that
reinstatement would be a futile gesture without supplying the financial
support to make movement of the employees' families and household
goods feasible. However, Judge Learned Hand pointed out in a case
prior to the enactment of section 8 (d) 11 ' that transportation expenses
were punitive rather than remedial since there is no indication that the
employer would have agreed to pay for transportation.'" The clear
implication of such a suggestion is that transportation and moving
expenses are substantive contractual terms which are the subjects of
bargaining." Hence, it is at least questionable under the Porter deci-
sion whether relocation expenses should be imposed upon the employer
by the Board.
The Board has devised other remedies from time to time under
its broad power to do so under section 10(c). Though they do not neces-
sarily fall within the prohibitons of Porter, it is debatable whether they
conform to the other guidelines within which the Board's remedial
power exists: that the order of the Board be remedial rather than puni-
137 Note, 19 U. Kan. L. Rev. 325, 328-31 (1971). But see the dissenting opinion in
Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 185 N.L,R.B. at 116-17, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1749-50.
lab Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175, 1176 (1972).
103 Former Members Brown and McCulloch.
170 Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Jenkins. Member Kennedy, who
came onto the Board after the first Board decision in Tiidee, also shares their view; see
Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L,R.B. No. 198, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972). Member Pencil°
did not assume his seat on the Board until after the second Board decision in Tiidee.
171 Section 8(d) was added to the Act in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970)).
172 NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872, 1A L.R.R.M. 585, — (2d Cir.
1938).
173 But cf. Rapid Bindery, Inc. v, NLRB, 293 F.2d 170, 177, 48 L.R.R.M. 2658,
2664 (2d Cir. 1961), in which the Second Circuit implied that it would have ordered the
payment by the employer of employees: moving expenses if it had found a violation of
8(a)(3) as well as §§ 8(a) (1) and (5).
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tive; and that the remedy effectuate the terms of the Act. 174 Orders to
bargain in good faith are particularly suitable to remedy section
8(a) (5) violations in relocation cases. The employer should be forced
to discuss with the union the impact of his move on employees.'" How-
ever, an order to bargain as to the decision to relocate is a futile
gesture.'" Rarely will wage considerations be the sole consideration
and less frequently will the union be able to sufficiently compromise
its wage demands to induce the employer to remain. Where the em-
ployer has already relocated his plant, the possibility of inducing the
employer back to the original site is negligible.
A stronger and more effective remedy which the Board has at-
tempted to implement in unlawful relocations is the recognition in the
new plant of the union which represented the employees in the original
plant. In Garwin Corp.,'" the employer had relocated his garment plant
from New York City to Miami, Florida for the purpose of defeating
the unionization of the New York plant. Recognizing that the tradi-
tional remedies would not serve to deter this employer, the Board
ordered the employer to recognize and bargain with the union at the
new plant for one year.'" The Board had previously limited the use of
this remedy to relocations within twenty-five miles of the original site
or where it was reasonable to expect a majority of former employees to
transfer to the new plant.17" Neither condition existed in Garwin. On
appeal, enforcement of the remedy was denied on the ground that the
Act provides for the compensation of injured workers rather than the
punishment of employers.'" In addition, the bargaining order denied
174
 See text at notes 136-37 supra.
175
 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d at 176, 48 L.R.R.M. at 2663. The
mandatory subjects of impact bargaining include employment at the new plant, trans-
portation and moving expenses, seniority, vacation rights, pension rights and severance
pay. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939, 65 L.R.R.M. 2861,
2866-67 (9th Cir. 1967); Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15, 19, 58 L.R.R.M.
1339, 1340 (1965). See Section of Lab. Rel. Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, The Developing Labor
Law 419 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
178 This is suggested by the fact that relatively few collective bargaining contracts
expressly limit management prerogative in plant relocation decisions by requiring bar-
gaining. See note 58 supra.
177 153 N.L.R.B. 664, 59 L.R.R.M. 1405 (1965).
178 Id. at 667, 683, 59 L.R.R.M. at 1409.
179 Twenty-five miles is an approximation of the maximum distance of relocation in
which the Board would certify the union at the new plant without an election or card
check. Compare Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 32 L.R.R.M. 1580
(1953) (union not certified at new plant after 30 mile relocation) and Bickford Shoes,
Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1346, 34 L.R.R.M. 1570 (1954) (union not certified at new plant after
30 mile relocation) with Fraser & Johnston Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 77 L.R.R.M. 1036
(1971) (union certified after 25 mile relocation) and Royal Norton Mfg. Co., 189
N.L.R.B. No. 71, 77 L.R.R.M. 1022 (1971) (union certified after 20 mile relocation).
155
 Local 57, ILGWU v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 64 L.R.R.M. 2159 (1967).
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the Florida employees their freedom of choice in selecting a bargaining
representative.
An alternative remedy with which the Board has experimented is
an order that the employer supply the union with a current list of em-
ployee names and addresses at the new plant for one year, and that the
employer bargain with the union in the new plant if a majority of the
employees subsequently designate it as their representative. This was
the remedy applied on remand of the Garwin case." While conforming
with the appellate decision, it also balances the equities of permitting
employees their freedom of choice while deterring future relocations.
However, this remedy still misses the mark. It does nothing for the
injured employees who choose not to transfer, it does not aid the status
quo doctrine, and it fails to effectuate the policies of the Act. Section
10(c) is limited to redressing the injuries of the employees against
whom the unfair labor practices were committed; it does not contem-
plate compensating injured unions, and penalizing the employer is
prohibited.
Despite the concern of many with regard to the insufficiency of
current remedies,'" there have only been a handful of flagrant viola-,
tions in which these remedies were not entirely adequate.'" For this
reason, one remedy which the Board has repeatedly held to be within
its arsenal of weapons, but has never used, is an order that the employer
move his plant back to its original site.' Common law authority for the
use of this remedy prior to adoption of the NLRA is doubtful.l 8 ' While
the remedy goes far toward achieving status quo ante, it is impractical
in most situations, and amounts to a severe restriction on management
prerogative. Certainly the Board should not issue a move-back order
where the costs of the move would be confiscatory of the employer's
business or would force him to operate at a loss. For the most part, only
small operators in businesses with low ratios of capital to cost of pro-
duction, such as apparel or shoe manufacturers, could afford discrimina-
tory relocations. 18" Yet their very size enables them to defeat move-back
orders by declaring bankruptcy or by dissolution. However, move-back
181 169 N.L.R.B. 1030, 67 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1968).
182 See Brown, supra note 149, at 2.53.
188 See McGuiness, Is the Award of Damages for Refusals to Bargain Consistent
with National Labor Policy?, 14 Wayne L. Rev. 1086, 1102-03 (1968), where the author
points out that most employers comply with Board bargaining orders and only 11%
exhaust all review procedures before bargaining.
184
 Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. at 19, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1341; Note, A
Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 Va. L. Rev, 38, 57 (1968).
180 Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y.S. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936)
(union won specific performance of contract clause prohibiting relocation), is usually
cited as authority for a move-back order, but should be limited to its facts. Cf. Note, 50
Harv. L. Rev. 700, 701 (1937).
188 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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orders would be particularly appropriate to remedy relocations where
only certain operations or production contracts were transferred.'"
There the expense of moving back would be minimal and the facility to
house it still available. These types of transfers are particularly anal-
ogous to subcontracting since they involve minimal transfers of equip-
ment without changing the basic organization of the enterprise, and
the Supreme Court has enforced a Board order to resume operations
previously subcontracted in Fibreboard.'" Moreover, the move-back
order applicable to part of a plant operation is easier to rationalize in
the context of relocation than in subcontracting since the employer still
controls the allocation of jobs in a relocation, whereas he has delegated
this control in a subcontracting situation.
2. A Proposed Remedy
The Board has placed undue emphasis upon remedying discrim-
inatory plant relocations when such moves are only feasible among a
severely limited class of industries. Whether or not the Board is willing
to recognize it, plant relocations almost invariably are dictated by
economic circumstances usually beyond the power of unions to change.
For this reason, decision bargaining is frequently a futile gesture uti-
lized by unions to gain leverage in impact bargaining. Employee bene-
fits ultimately emanate from impact bargaining. Additionally, impact
bargaining effectuates the purposes of section 8(d) by permitting the
parties to reach their own terms. Due to a leverage advantage inuring
to the benefit of employers from the relocation itself, the enforcement of
impact bargaining prior to actual relocation, absent compelling eco-
nomic circumstances, is vital.
Since the availability of impact bargaining is the touchstone for
vindicating employee rights in the face of relocation, providing tem-
porary relief to enforce impact bargaining is more important for the
protection of employees than devising any ultimate relief lawful under
the Act. Instead of striving to achieve status quo ante once the reloca-
tion is an accomplished fact, the Board should preserve the status quo
by enjoining plant relocation until impact bargaining is settled or
reaches an impasse.'" The Board is empowered under section 10(j) 190
to seek a temporary injunction from a district court to enjoin a party
from continuation of present or future unfair labor practices. Section
10(j) is not available to private litigants, who would have to satisfy
187 See the dissent of Member Murdock in Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc., 108
N.L.R.B. 1369, 1376, 34 L.R.R.M. 1209, 1212 (1954).
188 Fibrebbard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
189 Cf. Note, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 741, 746-48 (1966). 	 •
190 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970).
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the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Acti" to obtain injunctive
relief.'" While injunctive relief has great potential for effectuating
Board policies by freezing the unfair labor practices pending litigation,
statistics indicate that the Board usually brings fewer than twenty such
actions a year.'" Indeed, though increased use of injunctions has been
suggested as a remedy for runaway shops,'" the Board has never used
its powers under section 10(j) to the fullest, perhaps mindful that to do
so would undermine one of the basic purposes of the Act, industrial
peace.'" There has been a traditional revulsion at the use of the injunc-
tion, which is grounded in the early history of the labor movement.'"
Additionally, an injunction is a strong weapon subjecting the charged
party to potential contempt proceedings and possibly doing him irrep-
arable harm.
Traditionally, a petitioner for a labor injunction would have to show
that he has been irreparably harmed, that the remedy at law is inade-
quate, and that the interference threatens to continue or will cause a
multiplicity of actions.'" This has been modified so that currently the
General Counsel must show substantial or irreparable harm and that
preservation of the status quo is required, or frustration of the purposes
of the Act, depending upon which circuit the case arises in.'" It seems
clear that a relocation without bargaining with the union should satisfy
any of these standards. In addition to the above requirements, the
301 29 U.S.C. $ 101 (1970).
192 Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies, supra note 184, at 71.
198
Year Petitions Filed Injunctions Granted Injunctions Denied
1964 18 7 2
1965 18 10 3
1966 17 9 1
1967 22 12 2
1968 16 7 2
1969 Is 6 3
1970 17 12 2
Compiled from the 1964-70 NLRB Annual Reports. Cases not adjudicated were dismissed,
withdrawn or settled.
184 Siegel, Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms
for an Expanded Use, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 457 (1972); Note, 64 Mich. L. Rev.
741, 746-48 (1966).
195 29 U.S.C.	 141(b) (1970).
190 Abodeely, Injunctive Powers under the NLRA in Collective Bargaining: Survival
in the 70's, at 106 (R. Rowan ed. 1972). However, it should be noted that it was the use
of the injunction to quell employee strikes, picketing and boycotts which led to labor
strife, not the injunction applied against management. See generally F. Frankfurter &
N. Greene, The Labor Injunction (repr. ed. 1963).
lin F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, supra note 196, at 54.
los Compare McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847, 63 L.R.R.M. 2065 (2d Cir.
1966) with Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 66 L.R,R.M. 2444
(8th Cir. 1967) and Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 66 L.R.R.M. 2111 (10th Cir. 1967).
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General Counsel must show that the employer is guilty of an unfair
labor practice.1 "'In making such a showing, some concrete action, such
as building a new plant or incorporating in another state, is more per-
suasive than failure to notify the union of the pending move and to
engage in impact bargaining. The employer should then be permitted to
show that he has substantial business justification for the relocation
and that he has fulfilled his duty to engage in impact bargaining. 290 If
the court grants an injunction, the Board's own rules of procedure
require it to give the case priority in its caseloads, 201 thus minimizing
the harm to the employer should he be found not to have violated the
Act.
The injunction is particularly appropriate to the runaway shop.
Where an employer has threatened to relocate in the face of union
organization or demands, yet refused to bargain concerning the impact
of the relocation, a temporary injunction restraining relocation until
bargaining has taken place would promote industrial peace and preserve
the status quo of the parties. While restricting management preroga-
tive, and perhaps frustrating corporate opportunity, it is nonetheless
true that an economically justified relocation has no need for threats to
employees, nor should the employer be permitted to destroy the bar-
gaining power of the union by relocating before bargaining as to the
effects of the move.
Nevertheless, there are serious limitations on the practical use of
the injunction in relocation cases. The injunction is useless against the
employer who relocates with no warning to the union. An employer may
not want to give his employees notice of the relocation until the move is
imminent in order to keep morale and production quotas normal. The
employer must first commit an unfair labor practice, for no injunction
may be sought under section 10(j) until a complaint has issued. Even
then, there may be a lapse of up to four weeks before the administrative
machinery of the NLRB petitions a district court for relief .202 Conse-
quently, the employer capable of quickly relocating may escape injunc-
tive measures.
The NLRB has once sought to enjoin a plant relocation before the
employer could effect the transfer. In Getreu v. Gas Appliance Supply
Corp.,' the General Counsel made a prima facie showing of section
8(a) (1), (3) and (5) violations where the employer had threatened to
199 Note, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 741, 747 (1966).
Zoo Id.
201 8 NLRB Rules and Regulations, Subpt. G, 29 C.F.R. § 102.94 (1972).
202 Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 Va. L. Rev. 38, 72 (1968) ; Abodeely,
supra note 196, at 110-11.
293 Civil No. 5291 (S.D. Ohio, April 5, 1963), discussed in 28 NLRB Ann. Rep. 145
(1963).
1168
PLANT RELOCATION
move his operation. The court enjoined the threats and the relocation
pending a full Board hearing on the allegations. However, the Board
failed in Hoffman v. Fraser & Johnston Co.204
 to convince the court to
order the employer, after the relocation had taken place, to reinstate
discharged employees at the new plant pending a full Board hearing.
In other contexts the Board has obtained temporary injunctive relief in
stopping an employer from subcontracting part of his operation, 205
ordering an employer to reinstate employees allegedly discriminatorily
discharged,200
 and restraining a corporation from dissipating its assets
where a substantial back pay order might result from Board proceed-
ings.2 °7
Preservation of the status quo by means of temporary restraining
orders is an effective remedy which will eliminate the reliance on post-
relocation remedies to achieve status quo ante in most cases. This is
particularly significant in light of the fact that most post-relocation
remedies contemplated by the Board are of doubtful validity under
Porter. Enjoining plant relocations until the completion of both impact
bargaining and a speedy determination of alleged unfair labor practices
will protect employee rights while creating only a minimal interference
with management's operation of the business.
CONCLUSION
To maximize efficiency in the face of geographical shifts in the
concentration of supply and demand in a dynamic and competitive
American economy, plant relocations should probably occur more fre-
quently than they do. However, employers traditionally have been
reluctant to relocate because of an attitude on the part of the NLRB
adverse to management decisions which undermine employee security.
In dealing with relocations, the Board has been slow to recognize that
at present most plant removals are motivated by economic factors
rather than anti-union sentiment, and that the runaway shop is a
phenomenon having more historical color than present significance.
Realistically, its occurrence is limited to specific industries, and to those
small companies having a low ratio of capital to cost of production and
employing largely unskilled or semi-skilled laborers. However, the
recent developments in the collateral areas of anti-union discrimination,
204 - F. Supp. —, 73 L.R.R.M. 2348 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Balicer v. Heirose Bindery,
Inc., — F, Supp. —, 82 L.R.R.M. 2891 (D.N.J. 1972).
200
 Jacobson v. M & W Gear Co., Civil No. 67-89D (D. Ill, June 13, 1967), dis-
cussed in 32 NLRB Ann. Rep. 179 (1967).
206 Potter v. Finesilver Mfg. Co., No. 3575 (D. Tex., Sept. 9, 1965), discussed in 31
NLRB Ann. Rep. 153 (1966).
207 Compton v. Southland Mfg. Corp., No, 505-65 (D.P.R., Dec. 3, 1965), discussed
in 31 NLRB Ann. Rep. 153 (1966).
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decision bargaining, successorship, and unfair labor practice remedies
seem to suggest that the attitude of the Board and courts toward plant
relocations may be undergoing a change.
Great Dane2" served to change the function of the Board from
the making of a subjective determination of the employer's motive in
relocating to that of applying a test placing on the employer the burden
of proving the existence of a substantial business justification for the
move. As long as the Board continues to view plant relocations as em-
ployer conduct having a comparatively slight impact on the exercise of
employee rights, the defense of economic justification will be available
to management. Hence, while under the pre-Great Dane test a move to
a non-union area based in part on the employer's desire to obtain lower
labor costs would be considered by the Board to be predicated on an
anti-union motive because of its discriminatory effect on the union at
the original plant; under the Great Dane standard, it is arguable that
lower labor costs, combined with other economic considerations, would
establish substantial business justification for the move.
The decision bargaining principle of Fibreboard2" should have
little effect, if any, on future plant relocations in the wake of the Gen-
eral Motors210 decision. It is difficult to envision a relocation that is not
a fundamental change in the direction of the corporate entity, although
transfers of particular operations within a plant or of production con-
tracts may still be subject to the duty to decision bargain because they
are closely analogous to subcontracting. Further, General Motors is an
indication that the Board and courts may well be more receptive in the
future to the argument that decision bargaining would unduly interfere
with management functions in effecting a relocation.
Post-purchase relocation is a special category of plant relocation, in
which the traditional Board policy of strictly applying the successorship
doctrine has impeded development and discouraged necessary economic
adjustment—in the form of plant relocation—in marginal ventures. The
fact that four justices of the Supreme Court in Burns21' were of the
opinion that more restraints, rather than fewer, should be placed on
the imposition of successorship suggests some possibility of relaxation
of the successorship doctrine in post-purchase relocations.
After the Supreme Court's decision in H.K. Porter,' many of the
remedies with which the Board has experimented in relocation cases
have become suspect as the imposition of collective bargaining terms.
If, as seems likely, decision bargaining concerning relocations is no
208 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
209 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
210 General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971).
211 NLRB v. Burns Intl Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
212 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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longer required by the Board, few employers who are not required to
engage in decision bargaining by the terms of their contracts will be
willing to do so, and the Board will only be willing to enforce the duty
to bargain about the impact of the move. Consequently, impact bar-
gaining will remain the mainstay of employee protection in plant reloca-
tions, and the Board must insure that the duty is performed prior to the
move. Thus, section 10(j) temporary injunctions against relocations
until impact bargaining has occurred will insure a maximum of em-
ployee protection with a minimum of interference with management
prerogative. The injunction is of equal utility against discriminatory
and non-discriminatory relocations since employers are under a duty
to bargain about the impact of all relocations. Preservation of the status
quo through a 10(j) injunction will eliminate the Board's quandary in
its attempts to restore status quo ante.
The implication of all of these developments considered together is
that the Board is now, or will be in the near future, more willing to
recognize the economic efficacy of plant relocations than it has been
traditionally. In addition, the Board, in devising remedies in the re-
location area, will probably be more wiling to experiment with hereto-
fore unconventional remedies in an attempt to balance more equitably
the protection of employee security and the management rights of
employers. This policy may well lead to greater use of the 10(j)
preliminary injunction by the Board, which satisfies the objective of
protecting employee rights, while at the same time does not substan-
tially impinge on management prerogative. The widespread use of the
preliminary injunction rather than remedies which increase the em-
ployer's costs, thus frustrating his purpose in moving, would be con-
sistent with a policy by the Board relaxing its restrictive attitude
toward relocations, and with a recognition that a plant relocation is
now more of an economic than a labor relations phenomenon.
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